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Abstract 
In a world that is developing fast, Africa’s relative stagnation is a human tragedy that challenges the 
development profession. Although climate and geography, and their effect on local institutions, are 
not in Africa’s favour, inappropriate policies (including neglect of agriculture) and weak institutions 
figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth. Recent evidence, however, points to 
accelerated growth in many parts of Africa. Analysis of agriculture shows that adverse effects of nature 
can be handled effectively, that efforts to develop and apply technologies for intensification in a variety 
of farming systems are under way, but that sustained adoption by the mass of smallholders has not 
sufficiently taken place. For that to happen, a variety of time- and location-specific complementary 
actions – both public and private – are needed, based on a right mix of disciplinary knowledge. With 
positive changes in governance and a revival of agricultural priorities in Africa, favourable conditions are 
emerging for renewed and better targeted external aid to support agricultural development.  
Additional keywords: development, governance, intensification
Introduction
During the second half of the 20th century, economic development has greatly 
contributed to overcoming poverty, improved food security, better access to education 
and health, and higher levels of welfare and choice. Spectacular advances at historically 
unknown rates of growth were realized in China and Vietnam, and now in India as 
well. As a result, millions of households were lifted out of poverty, and a new middle 
class is emerging all over Asia. Developments in Latin America were mixed and more 
modest. By any measure though, economic developments in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
been dismal, with many countries showing no progress for more than one generation.
 Africa’s economic stagnation was accompanied by growing doubts and division 
about the desired strategy and policies to reverse these adverse developments. The 
lively discussions about the mixed outcome of the economic reforms propagated in 
structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s raised new questions as to what 
constitutes good governance, which factors structurally hamper the proper functioning 
of markets and what consequences this has for collective action. Examples of these 
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‘new’ market failures are risks that cannot be covered so that futures markets and 
long-term contracts are absent, high information and transaction costs giving rise to 
alternative exchange mechanisms or institutions, or lack of social capital that causes 
and perpetuates exclusion. 
 Of growing importance is the co-ordination issue, which plays a crucial role in the 
development of technology for which critical mass is a necessary condition. But in 
sectors with a multitude of small producers, such a critical mass does not come about 
by itself and needs to be organized, but once present stimulates and attracts further 
research and development. In this way, the build-up of expertise generates increasing 
returns. Without public support, this process does not emerge. 
 Co-ordination has an interesting dynamic side as well, as illustrated by Hoff & 
Stiglitz’ (2001) definition of developing countries: “regions that are on a different 
production function and are differently organized than high-income countries”. In 
this structurally different configuration, multiple, i.e., low- and high-level equilibria 
are conceivable. However, acquiring superior technology and developing better-
adapted institutions by themselves will not ensure that a higher-level equilibrium can 
be reached. For that to happen, a society needs to successfully co-ordinate a variety 
of time- and location-specific complementary actions. Designing and executing 
these multiple interventions is not an easy task on a continent where markets and 
governments often fail, and faces stiff competition from more popular and appealing 
generic single programmes such as malaria eradication or fertilizer distribution. 
 These new analytical concepts from development theory have an important bearing 
on agriculture and rural development as well. In this context Meier (2001) mentions 
the great damage that many African countries have inflicted on themselves by poor 
price policies and neglect of infrastructure and support services. Although the welfare 
cost of these policies was clearly exposed, it took a while before the political economy 
of gainers and losers was properly recognized. Subsequent innovations in information, 
risk and contract analysis at a much more disaggregate level have enriched the micro-
economics of rural markets and institutions. The recognition of high transaction costs 
in rural commodity markets and a better understanding of complex linkages in factor 
markets and related institutions greatly increased the understanding of household 
decision-making and with it the effectiveness of outside interventions.
 Not only have developments in Africa stagnated in a globalizing and rapidly 
changing world, the continent has in many circles an image of doom and failure, with 
petty incidents filling the tabloids, reminding us of the way India or Indonesia were 
covered half a century ago (Guest, 2004). Can we with better analytical tools available 
now, explain why such a geographical divide has occurred? Is the gloomy picture of 
Africa really true? Is there something special or inevitable about Africa’s stagnation? 
If we find some answers, are they helpful to influence developments in Africa? In 
addressing these questions, the focus will be mainly on agriculture and the rural areas. It is 
where most Africans live and where poverty is concentrated (Zeller & Johannsen, 2004).
 Reflecting these questions, this article is organized as follows. First, some 
explanations are offered for Africa’s recent experience and disappointing performance 
in a more general context. Next, we focus on agriculture, discuss a number of 
development dilemmas typical for Africa, and contrast Africa’s experience with that 
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of most Asian countries. Particular attention is paid to the adoption and diffusion of 
modern, high-yielding varieties, and it is indicated under what conditions a Green 
Revolution type of agricultural intensification would be feasible in Africa. We then turn 
to recent advances and new initiatives in agricultural development and discuss the role 
international aid can play to accelerate current intensification efforts, recognizing its 
dismal past effectiveness in Africa. The final chapter concludes.
Africa: some explanations
Neo-classical growth theory tells us that countries with similar features converge and 
that latecomers catch up, like Ireland in the EU. If intrinsic country characteristics 
are different, conditional convergence occurs, i.e., countries sharing the same group 
features converge, but among groups there can be divergence. As Carter & Barrett 
(2006) argue, if African countries would feature common growth-retarding factors, 
there would be divergence and no catching-up between Africa and the rest of the world. 
Examples of such factors abound: a low population density and diverse geography, 
including long distances to the sea, causing low-density and expensive infrastructure. 
As a result, markets are far less developed than elsewhere in the world. Complex 
and diverse agro-ecological and climatic conditions unfavourably affect agriculture 
and health, and cause large variations in yields. Historically, Africa has suffered 
from slavery and institutional legacies of colonial rule, including ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, and more recently from cold war politics and the rapid spread of 
HIV/AIDS. Policies of overregulated markets, heavy taxation of agriculture, and 
wasteful spending of natural resource rents have been holding back development. 
 A second explanation rests on poverty traps related to thresholds that cause both 
low- and high-level equilibria given a country’s characteristics. To cross a minimum 
threshold level of capital or income (where returns are locally increasing), one needs 
a jump in technology, scale or nature of activity to reach a higher-level equilibrium on 
another production function. Without a co-ordinated push in terms of resources and 
adjustment of supporting institutions, the economy remains at a low-level equilibrium. It 
is an often argued (e.g., Collier, 2006) and popularized (Sachs, 2005) case that financial 
aid to supplement resources and technical aid to help reform institutions can be effective 
to assist lifting a country out of a low-level equilibrium. At the aggregate level, however, 
empirical evidence for such a ‘big push’ remains scant (Kraay & Raddatz, 2007).
 Poverty traps are probably more relevant at the micro-level of households 
where intrinsic characteristics like assets and location determine the possibilities 
of accumulation to reach a high-level equilibrium. Under locally increasing returns 
causing multiple equilibria, asset-poor households will be caught in a low-level 
equilibrium and unable to catch up with their better-off neighbours. Examples of 
increasing returns at low-income levels are plentiful: adoption of high-yielding 
varieties, a shift to improved dairy cattle, off-farm salaried employment, and self-
employment like operating a van or a taxi. In these examples increasing returns reflect 
characteristics of a new technology with higher input efficiency, a minimum scale, or 
the ability to specialize and go for more high-risk activities. Low savings and education 
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levels, the inability to access credit, and different forms of social exclusion are among 
the factors explaining divergence among households. 
 The recent work by Escobal (2005) is an excellent example of the dynamic interaction 
between the divergent nature of a household’s private assets and the provision of public 
infrastructure investment. Contrary to popular belief, Escobal found for the Peruvian 
Andes that the fruits of public investment in roads, education or health care lift the 
return to assets of wealthier households to a high-level equilibrium, but hardly reach 
the poor if their access to these public assets is not explicitly addressed. But if access is 
improved, there are clear synergies to be achieved, causing increasing returns when the 
right complementarities among different assets are sorted out, depending on time and 
location. Though in a different context, the approach advocated by Sachs (2005) for the 
Millennium villages in Africa reflects similar considerations. 
Driving forces
At the macro level, growth regressions have tried to establish which factors are likely 
to explain Africa’s slow growth. Reviewing these results, Collier & Gunning (1999) 
showed that lack of social capital or cohesion comes out as the most important factor; 
if combined with poor policies, it almost accounts for half of the growth shortfall. 
Ethnic diversity is important in societies lacking political rights, but disappears as 
an explanatory variable under more democratic regimes. Lack of openness to trade, 
a matter of policy as well as geography, and lack of financial services matter, but to a 
lesser extent. More important are deficient public services and infrastructure, which are 
high-cost and often poorly and selectively delivered. Public employment creation and 
the need to maintain an often narrow power base are at the root of this phenomenon. 
Climate, geography and a dispersed population create considerable volatility, to which 
terms of trade and policy variations can be added. Finally, though Africa received 
substantial aid flows, there is little evidence of a positive net effect on growth.
 Moving to evidence at the micro level, Collier & Gunning (1999) observed that 
lack of market openness and rural social capital, the high cost of risk-coping strategies 
(activity diversion, consumption smoothing by holding liquid assets), and poor public 
services confirm the aggregate findings about Africa’s stagnation. In their own words 
(Collier & Gunning, 1999, p. 100) “Africa stagnated because its governments were 
captured by a narrow elite that undermined markets and used public services to deliver 
employment patronage. These policies reduced the returns on assets and increased the 
already high risks private agents faced.” As a result, Africa faced an outflow of financial 
and human capital, and developed internally a variety of risk-coping mechanisms that 
reduced growth. Traditional rural institutions that were once a rational and efficient 
response to physical and socio-economic constraints did not sufficiently evolve to cope 
with new demands. Dissemination of learning and innovations remained therefore 
limited, extension badly organized, and credit provision poor. The system of taxation 
of international trade had a detrimental effect on agriculture. Some countries banned 
private trade and introduced widespread controls on prices and quantities. Not 
surprisingly, stories of black markets, smuggling, road blocks, and heavy evictions 
proved a rich source for popular reporting in the media. 
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Although climate and geography, and their influence on local institutions are not in 
Africa’s advantage, inappropriate policies and governance at both the macro and micro 
level appear to figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth. Focusing 
especially on rural development Omamo (2003) and Mwabu & Thorbecke (2004) 
arrived at similar conclusions: the physical environment in most of Africa is marked by 
exceptional diversity, creating great disadvantages for Green Revolution technologies 
that rely on standard technical packages for monocropping under controlled water 
management. But despite high potential returns, investment in physical infrastructure 
and agricultural research to address these issues has been widely neglected. 
 Co-variate crop risk has discouraged credit institutions in the lowland, semi-arid 
areas, and savings were channelled in semi-liquid assets such as animals to maintain 
consumption in hard times. In such an environment, agriculture remains trapped 
in a low-productivity equilibrium. On top of that, the effects of policies have on the 
whole been detrimental to the rural areas, the more so because incentives to resist the 
exploitative policies were small. With weak cohesion outside local rural communities, 
little investment by farmers in the land, and the prevalence of user over property rights, 
peasant organizations have remained weak or absent.  
Agriculture 
Having touched on agriculture, let us elaborate a bit more the great divide between 
Africa’s allegedly stagnating agriculture and the successful developments elsewhere, 
especially in Asia. Overall, most Africans south of the Sahara are hardly better off now 
than at the time of independence half a century ago. At that time the average income in 
Africa was twice as high as that in Asia. Now, the average income in South Asia is well 
above that in Africa, and in East Asia even three times as high. 
 A similar trend can be observed for agriculture: measured by cereal yields, those in 
Africa have slowly increased from 0.7 to 1.0 ton per ha, whereas in South Asia yields 
have climbed to 2.5 and in East Asia to 4.5 tons per ha. At the time of independence, African 
countries on the whole were self-sufficient in food, by now many are food importers and 
recipients of food aid. A staggering 40% of all Africans go hungry, and half of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is classified as extremely poor, i.e., surviving on less than 1 US$ a day.
 In Africa, like in most of the developing world, poverty is concentrated in the rural 
areas. Though urban slums catch the eye by their visibility, three quarters of the poor live 
in rural areas where agriculture is a dominant but low-productivity sector, absorbing most 
resources. In these circumstances, gains in agricultural productivity enable an increase 
in food supply, reduce food prices, contribute to employment and generate resources for 
non-agricultural development. Net food-buying households (more than half of the rural 
and all urban households) gain through lower food prices, and nominal wages, important 
for development elsewhere, can therefore be kept in check. Net food-selling households 
realize income gains if price declines remain in line with productivity increases. Such 
developments are the more likely when agriculture growth stimulates other activities, 
generating additional income and food demand. If non-farm development is accompanied 
by a tightening of the rural labour market, even more income gains will emerge.
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In the World Development Report 2008, Agriculture for Development (Anon., 2007), a 
strong empirical case is made for the comparative advantage of agriculture to reduce 
poverty. Econometric analysis over the last two decades for 42 developing countries 
shows that for the poorest deciles in the expenditure distribution, a 1% GDP growth 
in agriculture increases their income by more than 2.5%. A similar increase in non-
agricultural growth generates less than half of this effect (Christiaensen & Demery, 
2007). At higher levels of income, the agricultural growth effect on poverty decreases, 
but remains superior to non-farm activities. Taking cereal yields as a proxy for 
agricultural productivity, its role in reducing poverty marks a contrasting experience 
between South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In South Asia, a steady increase in cereal 
yields during the period 1987–2001 was accompanied by decreasing levels of poverty. 
In Africa low cereal yields and high poverty hardly changed during the same period.
 Earlier we concluded that unfavourable physical conditions and an anti-rural policy 
bias go a long way in explaining Africa’s slow (agricultural) development. The policy 
bias has been aggravated by a dismal record in public underinvestment in African 
agriculture. Public spending on African agriculture, including investment in R&D, 
stands at an all-time low of less than 7% of agricultural GDP, against 11% in Asia and 
almost 13% in Latin America. Donor support to agriculture in Africa has dwindled from 
US$ 3–4 billion in the late 1980s to US$ 1 billion now. While the OECD countries 
are subsidizing and protecting their farmers in ways that distort world markets, 
African countries are denied trading opportunities equivalent to almost US$ 2 billion 
in lost income, twice the size of these countries foreign assistance (Gabre-Madhin & 
Haggblade, 2004; Anon., 2007). Policy bias is clearly not confined to Africa. 
 To avoid any misunderstanding, expansion of food staple production has increased 
in Africa, but on the whole its rate of increase has been outstripped by population 
growth. Given the low rate of yield increase, additional production has mainly come 
from expanding the area cultivated and from shorter fallow periods, largely maintaining 
conventional farming techniques. This is reflected by the low adoption rates of modern 
crop varieties: on average 22% in Sub-Saharan Africa against 78% in South Asia and 
84% in East Asia (Evenson & Gollin, 2003). Fertilizer use is minimal and irrigation 
underutilized. No wonder soil degradation is becoming a major problem causing 
further productivity losses.
An African dilemma  
Why then – with an African food crisis imminent – is there so little increase in crop yields, 
or in other words, why is a type of Green Revolution that triggers intensification not 
happening in Africa? A common response (summarized in Anon., 2007, Box 2.2) to this 
question points to Africa’s low population density in relation to its land availability. Bringing 
more land under cultivation, i.e., extensification, is then a rational response at the farm 
level, rather than going for higher yielding, more expensive and risky inputs to increase 
production on existing land. However, with the current high rates of population growth and 
correcting for land quality, population densities in much of Africa now are approaching 
those in Asia at the beginning of the Green Revolution. Based on these considerations, 
there is no doubt that Africa ought to have its version of a Green Revolution. 
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Another reason relates to the earlier mentioned intrinsically diverse agro-ecological 
conditions in Africa. As a result, Africa has a wide range of rain-fed farming systems 
producing a broad range of staples. Asian Green Revolution technologies initially 
focused on irrigated rice and wheat in fairly homogeneous environments. Transfer 
to Africa therefore requires location-specific adjustments for a much broader range 
of crops to realize the potential for yield increases. Obviously, the necessary R&D to 
achieve this is costly and crucially depends on generous public funding from national 
and international sources. But even if this potential would be realized, adoption by 
farmers will of course depend on the effective provision of a variety of complementary 
public and private inputs, proper marketing and favourable policy incentives.
 An important contribution to a better understanding of the process of 
intensification in African agriculture is the recent work by an African–Swedish 
research collaboration of sociologists, geographers and economists (Djurfeldt et 
al., 2005). Based on a survey of more than 3000 households in more than 100 
villages located in different agro-ecological environments of 8 African countries, and 
supplemented with historical accounts of earlier African efforts to intensification, the 
authors firmly concluded that modern varieties were and are being adopted in various 
countries (see also Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, 2004; Anon., 2007). The African 
agro-ecology does pose constraints, but here an old adage of development theory 
applies: it is the response to a constraint rather than the constraint itself that matters. 
Technologies appropriate to Africa are more and more ‘on the shelf’ and returns to the 
development of new ones are high. 
 Analysing the earlier successes of high-yielding varieties in Japan and post-war 
East and South Asia, Djurfeldt et al. (2005) arrived at the conclusion that the Green 
Revolution in Asia was a state-driven, market-mediated and small-farmer based strategy 
to attain self-sufficiency in food grains. The latter reflected both nationalistic and 
international geo-political considerations, and was considered, or at least tolerated, 
as a condition for rapid industrial growth. Foreign aid was accepted against the 
background of these considerations and played an important role. Although mostly 
driven by authoritarian regimes, participatory strategies in agriculture were common, 
with successes counting heavily to legitimize the ruling regime. Providing public 
R&D, infrastructure and institutional support, using markets effectively to channel 
inputs and outputs, and reaching out to the millions of small family farms did not 
come without resistance. In India it took a fierce debate with the powerful planners 
supporting ample funding of heavy industry and import substitution. In Indonesia, 
policy change was only possible after a dramatic change of regime.  
 The three characterizing elements of the successful process of adoption of modern 
varieties in Asia have largely been absent in most of Africa. Historically, many present-
day African states “did not develop from within and in conflict with each other, .... 
they function as members of the international state system” with the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs as a core element (Djurfeldt et al., 2005, pp. 14–15). 
Although most African states had no uncontested domestic power monopoly, their 
stability was held up by the non-interference principle and international support. Left 
to solve their domestic legitimacy problems, support was sought from the small urban 
elite, the army and large cash crop producers. The majority of the population was thus 
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excluded from the modernization process, and interventions were geared towards the 
interest of a small elite, with an urban bias in budget allocations and markets distorted 
in their favour. No wonder that the domestic reforms conditioned by the World Bank 
in its structural adjustment programmes were viewed as violating non-interference 
and met with fierce ideological resistance by the ruling elite. Having to rely on such a 
narrow power base is a far cry from the Asian development state where leadership was 
committed to broad-based and inclusive development on which the legitimacy of its 
regime was ultimately based.
Are advances looming?
Putting the evidence on staple food production together, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has certainly not been without growth, in particular for maize and cassava, but 
intensification has been patchy, largely bypassing smallholders, and has not led to a 
sustained increase in productivity. During and shortly after the colonial period, maize-
based hybridization technologies have spread from Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Kenya 
over the sub-continent. Research on hybrid maize was initiated during the 1930s, and 
since the 1950s a series of high-yielding varieties were released and adopted (Djurfeldt 
et al., 2005, chapter 5). However, after independence most African governments did 
not perceive food self-sufficiency as a problem, and without much effort extensification 
was assumed to take care of additional supply. 
 With steadily decreasing food prices on the world market food import became an 
attractive alternative and food aid could always be counted on as a last resort. Moreover, 
African states faced few external threats. With their limited internal legitimacy, willingness 
and sometimes capacity to implement reforms, governments were understandably tempted 
to avoid the demanding route of intensification. All this happened in the face of mounting 
evidence of an increasing yield gap, illustrating the high potential of newly developed 
technologies that were adjusted to the nature of African conditions.
 The nature of this paradox has not gone unnoticed by a younger generation of 
the African intelligentsia and policy-makers, or by the more informed part of the 
international community. Numerous initiatives and changes before and around the turn 
of the century have resulted in profound changes in governance, improved transparency 
and participation, and in a more realistic view on African development (Owusu, 2003; 
Anon., 2007). As a result, a wave of ‘positive news’ is now emerging, documenting 
successes and emphasizing the opportunities for change. Building on long-standing 
policy and research work by CGIAR in Africa, the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) has made repeated efforts to make this information widely available 
(Schioler, 1998; Haggblade, 2004). As in the Djurfeldt et al. (2005) study, micro-evidence 
and an extensive expert survey reported by Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade (2004) show that 
modern varieties and improved practices are finally making an impact in Africa.
 Maize breeding has had its ups and downs (following the withdrawal of fiscally 
unsustainable subsidies in the 1980s), but across Africa farmers are now reported to 
plant almost half their area to improved varieties. Improved disease-resistant clones of 
cassava, developed during the past three decades, have been widely adopted and have 
improved the lives of probably 100 million poor consumers and farm family members. 
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Successes in on-farm breeding of bananas in the central highlands of East Africa, 
cotton in West Africa, rinderpest disease control, and new common bean varieties with 
multiple stress resistance can be added. The New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a yield-
increasing, low-input variety, released a decade ago, is now cultivated on 200,000 ha, 
a modest but promising start.
 It is puzzling how these well-established micro findings contrast with the bleak 
aggregate picture of African agriculture. Others, including the Centre for World Food 
Studies (Keyzer & Van Wesenbeeck, 2006), have made similar observations, partly on 
the basis of nutritional data. Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade (2004) hypothesized that 
the paucity of agricultural sample frames and the difficulty of measuring minor crops 
as well as crop output that is harvested all year, might well create a downward bias in 
aggregating field data. If true, this would confirm that hunger in Africa, like elsewhere 
in the world, is more a problem of poverty than of deficient availability.
 To sustain these successes requires both improved technologies and favourable 
production incentives. The IFPRI expert survey underlines in particular the widening 
of technological options: three fourths of the stimuli to trigger agricultural change 
involve the expansion of the farmer’s physical opportunity set. As the most important 
interventions are considered – in order of importance – (1) the development of new 
technology itself, (2) improved access to it through superior inputs and extension, and (3) 
increased farmer assets, of which the latter two could be labelled socio-economic issues 
as well. Improved policy and institutional incentives account for the remaining quarter, 
though the social scientists in the survey come up with a substantially higher rating of 
around two fifths. With science-based technology as a key driver of agricultural growth 
(as economic growth theory incidentally tells us), the dramatic declines in agricultural 
R&D funding (see e.g., Anon., 2007, chapter 7) are a clear threat indeed to much 
needed future agricultural innovation in Africa. 
Acquiring higher yields: recent research initiatives
The recent UN InterAcademy Council Report (Anon., 2004) on science and technology 
strategies to improve agricultural productivity in Africa is a bold attempt to specify 
high-yielding technologies to raise productivity in a sustainable way and contribute to 
improved food security. The report stresses the earlier factors that differentiate farming 
systems in Africa from those in Asia (diverse, mainly rain-fed systems on weathered 
soils, rudimentary infrastructure, weak institutions and biased policies). The diversity 
of farming systems and crop and livestock variety means that Africa lacks the scale 
advantages in the development and diffusion of new technologies, which necessitates a 
higher and more costly research effort. Thanks to past research efforts, adoption of new 
varieties is taking place, roughly now at a pace comparable with that of a generation 
ago in Asia (Anon., 2004, p. 160).
 Out of many distinct farming systems identified by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) – varying though across and within the 
major agro-ecological zones of Africa – four systems have been selected that have the 
greatest potential for improving productivity and reducing malnutrition. These systems 
are (1) a maize-based mixed system, (2) a cereal/root crop mixed system, (3) an irrigated 
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system, and (4) a tree crop-based system. All consist of multiple cropping systems, with 
livestock and off-farm activities in some. Based on a production-ecology approach, a 
range of technological options is then specified taking into account relevant constraints 
and goals. The options are translated into pilots, and due attention is paid to issues of 
institution building, the need for more extensive training of new African agricultural 
scientists, market enhancement and farmer participation. Constraints in these areas 
are well analysed and discussed, but do not directly influence the choice of techniques.
 Research strategies and policies for Africa are realistically discussed. On 
the domestic front no secret is made of the lack of priority for R&D by African 
governments themselves. Counting the agricultural priorities listed in 24 African 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Roseboom et al., 2004) shows that research 
appears in only 4 documents, only slightly better than disaster management, which 
comes last. (Ironically, diversification out of agriculture has one of the highest scores.) 
Generous past donor funding may have played a role here, but the low domestic 
priority accorded to agricultural research may well have backfired and given donors an 
excuse for complacency. This low priority is in painful contrast to the consistently high 
rates of returns for agricultural R&D in Africa: almost four fifths of the programmes 
promise returns in excess of 20% (Anon., 2004, p. 158, based on IFPRI data).
Adoption in an imperfect environment
The approach followed in the InterAcademy Report (Anon., 2004) offers an excellent 
window of opportunities for further intensification efforts all over Africa. It shows 
convincingly that high-yielding varieties appropriate to the diverse conditions of African 
agriculture are within reach and can be gainfully applied. However, having stated a 
good case how sure are we that different types of farmers working in an environment of 
incomplete markets and institutions and often adverse policies, are likely to adopt the 
proposed technologies, and if so which ones? Can we convince governments that it is in 
their interest to support this process, and reform their policies accordingly? It is here that 
the ‘one-quarter’ or ‘two fifths’ contribution of and interaction with social scientists is 
essential and where development economics has made major contributions.
 Farm households are heterogeneous in terms of assets and livelihoods. Their 
ability to access knowledge, modern inputs and finance differs, some are small 
and subsistence-oriented, other ones hesitate to take risk, the additional produce 
needs more labour, and then proper marketing to prevent price falls. But even if 
intensification promises high returns, off-farm work and migration may be even 
more rewarding. Under high transaction costs in product markets and an imperfectly 
functioning labour and credit market, a price hike for a cash crop may have little effect 
on its output when the farmer cannot divert family labour out of food crops. This may 
happen when the farm household cannot rely on additional (hired) labour or on the 
food market to make up for any deficit. Intensification would help, but if that requires 
more cash inputs like fertilizer or brings more risk, lack of credit or the absence of 
fertilizer traders will stall adoption. 
 Empirical findings confirm this as Bagamba (2007) found in the case of banana 
production in Uganda: either attractive off-farm employment near the towns or failing 
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markets in the countryside drove farmers partly away from remunerative banana 
production. For Kenya, Salasya (2005) found crop output to be hardly responsive 
to fertilizer prices because labour was not available at affordable prices. But even 
where more labour was accessible, farmers were found to underuse fertilizer, in full 
knowledge of its beneficial effect, because of failing credit facilities. 
 Determining the impact of technological innovations is therefore a truly Sisyphean 
task that requires careful modelling work to account for all these considerations. One 
way to do this is to start out from observed household behaviour and to model, in 
close co-operation with biophysical colleagues, the agro-ecological and socio-economic 
conditions in so-called bioeconomic models that enable scenario analysis. Such an 
analysis can simulate and increase the understanding of adoption behaviour, the 
effect of policy interventions on technology choice, the effect of failing markets and 
institutions, trade-offs between goals expressing efficiency, equity and sustainability, 
and dilemmas such as the cost of removing a constraint, say finance, versus the 
adoption of a second-best technology that needs less finance for its adoption. 
 Multidisciplinary, bioeconomic work of this type has been applied to the humid 
Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica (Bouman et al., 2000) with a strong focus on ecological 
impacts, to the semi-arid cotton zone of Mali (Kuyvenhoven et al., 1998a) to better 
understand the relation between food security and natural resource management, and 
recently to the problems of less-favoured areas (Anon., 2007, chapter 8; Ruben et al., 
2007), home to hundreds of millions of people where the gainful options for competitive 
high-yielding varieties are much more limited. These and other studies (Kuyvenhoven 
et al., 1998b) show how both agro-ecological and socio-economic factors determine the 
choice and effect of technology. The results are also relevant to agenda setting in national 
agricultural research institutes. After a socio-economic screening of the technical 
windows of opportunities, more focused questions about promising options can be 
asked. In addition, for those technologies likely to be adopted, indications can be given 
of the complementary measures needed to make intensification a success.
Adding supportive policies, markets and institutions
It is in the field of the necessary policy and institutional incentives for intensification 
that the World Development Report 2008 (Anon., 2007) makes a refreshing contribution, 
one that can be considered complementary to the InterAcademy Report (Anon., 2004). 
A few examples illustrate its relevance for the agriculture-based economies of Africa. 
First and foremost, Africa is poorly served by infrastructure, in particular roads. As a 
result, transportation costs are higher than in the rest of the world, reducing producer 
prices and incentives, making essential inputs expensive if available at all, and hence 
severely constraining market participation and competitiveness. Many state-run 
market institutions proved ineffective and have either disappeared or were reformed 
and privatized. But, in IFPRI’s words, the road to more effective marketing has only 
been half travelled (Van Tilburg et al., 2000; Kherallah et al., 2002), leaving important 
market failures unresolved at great cost. As much research has shown (e.g., Fan & 
Hazell, 2001; Fan & Chan-Kang, 2004; Escobal & Torero, 2005), improving transport 
unleashes numerous new activities, greatly improves labour supply, and makes one of 
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the highest contributions to poverty reduction.
 After the demise and reform of institutions during the period of structural 
adjustment, innovations needed to improve agricultural input supply have proven 
controversial, in particular those related to financial services, seed and fertilizer. No 
golden bullets from theory are on offer here and a search for best practices characterizes 
the current debate. Rural credit stands out here: high information and enforcement costs 
keep commercial banks at bay. Local savings and loan association may then fill the need 
for credit, but these associations are selective, with membership fragmented along lines 
of location, kin- or ethnic-based networks, or assets. The strongest members of society 
do not participate because they can access the bank, and the weakest are unwelcome 
because they increase risk. Moreover, poor farmers are often unwilling to run the risk 
of losing collateral. Given the seasonality in agriculture, the need to pre-finance inputs 
and transition requirements when moving to higher-value crops, the cost of financial 
constraints for smallholders in terms of opportunities foregone can be huge (Anon., 
2007, chapter 6) and there is great need for institutional innovations.
 Microfinance has proven successful when loans can be used for a diversity of short-
term activities, but does not work well when most producers are subject to common 
weather risks and land markets are hardly developed. Innovations might focus on 
other collateral assets than land such as standing crops, or to open up the possibility to 
mobilize savings. In this way microfinance can then possibly be linked to conventional 
banking institutions through the creation of reputation collateral to improve client 
selection. But this does not reduce weather or price risk. Alternatively, public 
agricultural banks can be reformed, learning from past failures, or local financial co-
operatives be strengthened.
 Seed and fertilizer markets are complicated markets where demand is highly variable 
in time and space, and the lack of economies of scale in supply and distribution cause 
high logistics and financing costs in all African countries. Consequently, farm gate 
input prices in Africa can be three times as high as in the rest of the world. Coupled 
with relatively low agricultural output prices and limited credit, adoption of modern 
varieties will then be problematic indeed. Public interventions in seed and fertilizer 
markets have often failed or became financially unsustainable, so that current 
efforts to improve markets focus on public�private partnerships in input distribution 
systems. Novel schemes involving (private) foundations, NGOs, public plant breeding 
and private seed producers and agro-dealers are being worked out in search of best 
practices (Morris et al., 2007). New challenges are arising here as much of the research 
in biotechnology and genetic modification is done by the private sector, with new 
varieties patented and not easily accessible, if relevant, to the poor (Pingali, 2007).
Alternative approaches
Before winding up the discussion on the possibilities of yield improvement in Africa, 
it needs to be emphasized that its contribution to poverty reduction is one among 
several rural livelihood strategies. Observing degrees of farm income diversification 
of one third (for low-income households) to more than one half (for the richer ones), 
Ellis (2005) argues that these off-farm labour- and migration-led strategies are puzzling 
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because they are not driven by agricultural success, as conventional theory would 
predict, but by agricultural failure. An illustration of the latter is the extra-ordinary 
share of households’ home consumption, and hence their limited market participation. 
Small domestic markets that are characterized by price instability, declining real 
output prices, adverse agricultural policies in the parastatal era followed by the market 
uncertainties and institutional vacuum after the reforms that were supposed to correct 
earlier state failures, have convinced rural households over the years that a strategy of 
food self-sufficiency and diversification would be best for them.
 Diversification, Ellis (2005) claims, has gone far beyond the classical reasons of risk 
and seasonality and recently cash needs, and has become a paradox in development. 
With households opting for non-farm strategies the livelihood school argues that 
migration and urbanization should be supported much more actively as contributing 
to possible poles of rapid growth. Without vibrant exports and increasing agricultural 
productivity, the incomes to be generated in industry and services to sustain rapid non-
food growth remain a challenge, but Ellis’ criticism of an easy optimistic agricultural 
stance on poverty reduction is a healthy reminder that farm households have more 
options than farming. Better seeds compete with better mobile phones.
 Without subscribing to Ellis’ involution argument, the recent World Development 
Report 2008 (Anon., 2007) reflects these considerations in a mix of productivity-
enhancing and diversification arguments. For the agriculture-based economies that 
characterize most of Africa, it recommends a farm strategy that facilitates market chain 
development, promotes smallholder competitiveness and market entry, improves the 
productivity of subsistence farmers and ensures safety nets, and promotes non-farm 
employment and migration through improved labour skills. For agriculture, this puts a 
heavy co-ordination burden on the shoulders of African governments and donors. It is 
their responsibility to develop and fund well-balanced technology and policy packages 
that provide better seeds, roads, credit or knowledge. To shy away from this task, as so 
many – including the Dutch development administration have done – is no option. 
Aid
Development aid is generously provided to Africa in many modalities and for many 
purposes. Most of it comes, economically speaking, for free or at below-market 
costs, and the competition for donor funds is fierce. In a rational world, with agreed 
development criteria like the Millennium Development Goals, aid would be allocated 
where it is most needed according to the best scoring proposals so as to maximize its 
effectiveness. As we know, reality is different. Aid serves purposes that are not related 
to development, and many, including academics, doubt its usefulness. If agricultural 
R&D programmes for Africa argue for increased support, as they do, they face an uphill 
battle: on the domestic front, with donors, and with aid sceptics. 
 Aid sceptics and critics such as Easterly (2006) argue that aid tends to increase 
public consumption rather than investment, keeps bad governments in power and 
postpones reforms, enriches corrupt elites, perpetuates costly aid lobbies, reduces the 
recipient’s own incentives and initiatives, creates dependency, and leads to ‘Dutch 
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disease’ through appreciation of the exchange rate that harms export. It provides a 
rich source of inspiration for the popular media. Aid proponents, from the passionate 
Sachs (2005) to the measured Collier (2007), emphasize the resource- and expertise-
enhancing role of aid, and point to the numerous successes in terms of countries and 
programmes (the Green Revolution created an international public good largely funded 
by aid). With aid having such opposing effects and being one factor among many 
contributing to development, empirical estimates of aid effectiveness are not only 
problematic, but can have any outcome. What matters, is to find modalities that favour 
the positive and minimize the negative effects of aid. 
 However, finding the right aid modalities is complicated by the position developing 
countries take. As Collier (2006) explains, technical assistance is criticized as expensive 
if not wasteful. But it has proven helpful in support of reforms and post-conflict recon-
struction. Project aid is considered un-co-ordinated and requiring far too much bureau-
cracy. Projects can add to public goods though, but their visibility should not be confused 
with accountability as donors and NGOs claim. Because of fungibility of resources, most 
donor-funded projects would have been undertaken anyhow. Programme aid and debt 
relief normally come with conditions that encroach on the recipient governments' own 
autonomy. And even proponents of aid see it as subject to diminishing returns, a point 
that most aid flows to African countries may well have reached. So it is useful to look 
first at recent aid performance, draw some lessons, and apply them to the case for more 
international support for agricultural intensification in Africa.
Aid performance
The last decade has seen a wealth of empirical work using aggregate data trying to establish 
whether aid is effective (for summaries see Collier, 2006; Goderis & Verbon, 2006). 
Whereas some studies find that aid is, on average, not effective, most studies now find that 
aid does improve growth. Aid effectiveness is claimed by some regardless of the domestic 
policy environment, but subject to diminishing returns; others emphasize its conditionality 
on good (economic) policies and governance. The latter position, which is by no means 
uncontroversial, is shared by the World Bank and a number of bilateral donors. Other 
findings point to a high effectiveness of aid after natural disasters, price shocks causing 
terms of trade losses, and during reconstruction efforts after violent conflicts and war. 
 Dalgaard et al. (2004) have stirred up a fierce debate with their finding that aid 
is effective, but less so in tropical, agriculture-based countries, of which there are 
many in Africa. The authors suggest that adverse geography and climate in the form 
of tropical land, diseases or being landlocked might play a role here. They also refer 
to the explanation of Acemoglu et al. (2001), who related geography to the nature of 
institutions: areas with high mortality rates for European settlers had few incentives to 
pay attention to lasting institutions. Dalgaard et al. (2004, p. 211) concede that it is hard 
to believe that aid would be less effective in the tropics. They hypothesized that tropical 
areas may have particular needs in terms of foreign assistance that have so far not been 
met. We think we have identified some of those needs in the foregoing.
 Aid conditionality is another contentious issue. Although resisted, the right 
application of conditionality can be defended on rational and even moral grounds. 
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Altruistic, unconditional aid is likely to act as an implicit tax on own initiatives, as the 
disincentive effects of for instance food aid show (Barrett, 2002). In contrast to ex ante 
conditionality based on promises, ex post conditionality based on good governance or 
desired outcomes appears to be working well. During the last decade this approach 
has enhanced aid effectiveness through selectivity in the choice of countries (Dollar 
& Levine, 2006) and aid allocations that are more in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals (Baulch, 2006). 
 Selectivity requires a degree of political courage though, and creates a dilemma 
where poverty and poor governance go together. In such a situation, policy contagion 
can help: successful reforms, and performance in countries supported by aid may well 
inspire neighbours to rethink their development strategy (as in the case of Vietnam, 
and even India observing China’s performance). Mosley et al. (2004) modified the 
verdict on ex ante conditionality by proposing another, ‘third’ way of new conditionality 
based on a policy dialogue that respects the recipient country’s priorities and focuses 
aid on pro-poor public expenditures to enhance development. Their proposal would 
further improve aid effectiveness and at the same time be able to influence policies.
Africa and aid
Turning in more detail to Africa, there is no doubt that past aid flows during the cold war 
era have had a dismal record (Collier & Gunning, 1999, p.74; Sundberg & Gelb, 2006, p. 
14). However, Collier (2006) warned for too much pessimism. Comparing the impact of 
aid flows with that of the unconditional natural resource rents, particularly oil, the impact 
of aid, thanks to its different modalities and conditionality, turns out to be far superior. 
Not only was “the growth rate of the non-oil part of African oil exporters ... identical to 
the rest of Africa”, resource rents also undermined democracy and the rule of law by 
making patronage on a large scale financially possible (Collier, 2006, pp. 1482–1484), 
the so-called resource curse. Without aid, Africa may therefore well have fared worse. 
 At the micro level there is ample evidence that aid is working now. Recent 
evaluations of projects funded by the World Bank show returns for Africa at par with 
the rest of the world, with high scores of over 20% for transport and communications, 
and agriculture. Moreover, the quality of donor-supported agricultural lending has 
improved markedly during the past decade (Anon., 2007, chapter 11).
 At the level of governance, changes are encouraging. African countries, though 
not all, have made substantial improvements, as measured by indicators of civil 
liberties, rule of law, policy and institutions (Collier, 2006; Dollar & Levine, 2006). A 
first beginning of a policy peer review has been made through the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and donors, though not all, are succeeding in 
making aid more poverty-effective by proper selection procedures. African economic 
performance is finally catching up, although the role of improved governance and 
external assistance needs more time and effort to have a lasting impact
Agriculture and development
Where does this leave the case for further assistance to agricultural intensification in 
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Africa? With estimated returns to agricultural R&D high and realized returns in agriculture 
and rural infrastructure more than satisfactory, there is little doubt that substantially more 
resources can be gainfully absorbed. For most of these activities, however, those who make 
the cost to develop them cannot be expected to fully appropriate the benefits. These services 
need therefore public funding, although they can be, and sometimes are, provided by the 
private sector under a proper regulatory framework. 
 However, long-term investments compete unfavourably with public spending 
that promises quick results or with input subsidies that are often captured by a small 
elite of large farmers. The until recently depressed prices on many agricultural world 
markets are not an encouraging signal either. Many governments, especially of smaller 
countries, count on the spillover of R&D by others (Anon., 2007, chapter 7). Given 
Africa’s heterogeneous agriculture, the potential to capture spillovers are smaller than 
elsewhere, but due to the small country size in Africa, national agricultural research 
systems are fragmented, lack scale and are either too expensive or ineffective. 
 A stronger domestic commitment and budget priority for agriculture, better 
integrated markets, regional co-operation to capture scale economies in research, 
and strong links with international agricultural research centres therefore appear 
necessary conditions to justify more external assistance. There are encouraging signs 
that African governments are finally committed to increase their own efforts to focus 
on agriculture-led growth and poverty reduction under the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme of NEPAD. Coupled with better training and 
institutional reforms, these initiatives will enable the strengthening of the capacity of 
African countries’ agricultural administration, and a better balance between domestic 
and external funding. Despite the relatively low levels of donor support, in several 
countries that balance is currently too much biased towards external funding. 
 Donors could assist in this process, provided their priorities support it and they are 
willing to co-ordinate their own programmes better. But they too have to cope with the 
requisite of immediacy, visibility, appeal, and electoral reward, certainly in the eyes of 
the media. Long-term investments in agriculture (including markets, rural finance, 
research and extension) and infrastructure (irrigation, roads, transport, power, and 
telecommunications) compete with social programmes and emergency aid, and for 
some NGOs with the obvious visibility of schools, medical programmes or water wells. 
The situation for agricultural R&D is further complicated by the comparatively large 
amount of maintenance research on breeding for pests and diseases that is needed to 
retain current yield levels. One third to one half of agricultural R&D may be needed for 
this purpose, a little known fact to most people. 
 Since the turn of the millennium, however, the prospects for donor support 
look better. Both developing and developed countries have come to recognize more 
explicitly the importance of agriculture for development (the new Dutch Minister for 
Development Co-operation has included agriculture among his priorities, a hopeful 
sign after many years of neglect). Markets for high-value products and biofuels are 
rapidly expanding, and the OECD countries have started to reform their farm policies, 
albeit on a modest scale. 
 Within Africa, decentralization, farmer (including women) empowerment, and 
public–private partnerships are coming up, signalling better prospects for a market-
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oriented, small farmer strategy. Challenging options are emerging: decentralized 
approaches to plant breeding and varietal selection involving farmers at an early 
stage can reduce development and dissemination of new and high-yielding varieties 
from 10–15 to 5–7 years. Commercially viable FM radio services, cell phones and 
solar-powered internet services nowadays convey price and market information that 
substantially lowers the transaction costs of poor farmers in dealing with traders. 
Private sector involvement, including NGOs, in extension, rural credit, technical 
and marketing advice has in many countries lifted the quality and timing of service 
delivery. The rapid development of value chains has opened up export opportunities 
for farmers who a decade ago were only serving local markets and hesitant to adopt 
high-yielding crop varieties. But all this should not distract from the need to justify and 
mobilize continued external assistance to co-fund public goods and expertise based 
on the classical arguments of evidence- and science-based policy, proper lobbying and 
leadership that is able to build political capital and shows results. 
Concluding remarks
In a world that is developing fast, Africa’s relative stagnation is a human tragedy that 
challenges the development profession. Economic theory explains how areas that 
feature common growth-retarding factors can diverge from and fail to catch up with the 
rest of the world. Although climate and geography, and their effect on local institutions 
are not in Africa’s advantage, inappropriate policies and weak institutions, i.e., bad 
governance, appear to figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth. 
 Media coverage emphasizing failures has not added to Africa’s image, but many 
examples of successes documented by experts have gone unreported, creating 
confusion about the real state of affairs. So have poor statistics. Visible achievements 
at the micro level often do not show up at more aggregate levels, which complicates 
issues like food security, child malnutrition and urban poverty. Recent evidence of 
accelerated growth in most of Africa clearly contradicts the image of gloom, but still 
has to find its way outside the circle of development experts.
 Analysing the developments of Africa’s largest sector, agriculture, and comparing it 
with the successes of the Green Revolution in Asia, illustrates that the common factors 
explaining Africa’s disappointing performance are not necessarily typical for Africa, 
although the intensity with which they constrain development appear to be stronger 
than elsewhere. These circumstances create serious poverty traps and cause initially 
higher costs to address the growth-retarding constraints. Analysis of the current state 
of affairs in agriculture shows that the adverse effects of nature can be handled, that 
efforts to develop and apply technology for intensification in a variety of farming 
systems are under way, but that sustained adoption by the mass of smallholder farmers 
has not sufficiently taken place. 
 It is probably here that the best lessons can be learned from the Asian Green 
Revolution: no successful distribution of technological innovations like high-yielding 
and more resistant varieties is possible without the complementary actions, both 
private and public, that make it attractive and justifiable to adopt new varieties and 
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practices. As these activity packages are likely to be location- and time-specific, that is 
not an easy task. How precisely to cover risk, make credit available, target subsidies, get 
fertilizers, find new marketing outlets, have better roads and provide more education 
and health facilities is analytically demanding, but impressive expertise has been built 
up and best practices (not to be confused with social engineering) are emerging.
 Another lesson is the recognition that for agricultural intensification to succeed, the 
right mix of disciplines is needed, based on fruitful co-operation and mutual awareness 
of the contribution of natural and social sciences. Several CGIAR centres, often in 
combination with universities, international NGOs and philanthropic foundations have 
made a promising start with this type of work. It is illustrative that a recent initiative of 
the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations to help develop new varieties suited to African 
conditions has an almost 50/50 split of research funding for breeding and the entire 
distribution system.
 The effective implementation of channelling the right amount of funds into 
agricultural R&D, selecting appropriate policies and public sector investment, and 
targeting external assistance is a tall order for good governance. But promising signs 
are emerging in several African countries, showing growing democratization, more 
transparent public sector management, decentralization, and farmer empowerment. 
Old ways die hard, certainly in politics, embedded as they are in vested interests, but 
a move away by a new generation of politicians from patronage and serving narrow 
interests is visible. External aid, ineffective in the past, has found a new architecture 
that is much better targeted towards poverty alleviation and supportive of efforts to 
improve governance. 
Note
The present text is an extended version of the author’s farewell address as professor of 
development economics at Wageningen University. 
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